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The Relationship between Margin Changes and Volatility in Futures Markets  
Ya Cai 
 
Traders in futures markets are required to deposit initial margin requirements for their 
open futures positions and maintain minimum margin requirements for these open 
positions.  Futures exchanges set these margin requirements and require higher margin 
requirements for more volatile contracts. It has been argued that futures exchanges may 
use changing margin requirements to control the volatility of futures contracts and this 
question is still of interest. To address this question, I investigate the relationship between 
margin changes and futures price volatility for 24 different futures contracts, which include 
contracts on agricultural commodities, livestock, equity indices, interest rate and foreign 
currency. I provide evidence using univariate tests that the futures price volatility is 
significantly reduced following margin increases, while the futures price volatility 
increases but to a lesser extent following margin decreases. A regression analysis shows 
that larger margin changes have a greater negative effect on the futures price volatility. 
This relationship holds for the different futures contracts. Finally, it may be argued that 
margin requirements and futures price volatility are endogeneous variables. To address the 
potential presence of endogeneity, I employ the instrumental variables technique along 
with two stages least squares estimation and find that the inverse relationship between 
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Chapter 1  
1. Introduction 
The margin requirement for a futures contract serves two purposes-it helps protect the integrity 
and reputation of the futures exchange, and it protects the broker from customer default. Normally 
in futures exchanges, the clearing house determines the “initial margin” , which is the margin that 
market participants must pay when they initiate their futures position with their clearing firm, as 
well as the “maintenance margin”, the level at which market participants must maintain their 
margin over time. Specifically, if the balance of a trading account is lower than the maintenance 
margin, then a margin call will be issued and the customer is required to post an additional margin 
(variation margin) to bring the balance back to the initial margin level. Margins thus play an 
important role in guaranteeing contractual obligations by ensuring that both realized and potential 
losses will be covered. Furthermore, the existence of margins also decreases the likelihood of 
systemic instability (Longin 1999). Extreme volatility in futures market is a signal of high default 
risk and futures market instability. According to Hsiao and Shanker (2014), extreme volatility in 
futures markets may also lead to volatility in the underlying commodity market. Clearly, excessive 
volatility in futures market is undesirable. This raises the question of whether margin requirements 
can also be utilized to alter futures market volatility.  
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that passed in 2010 gives 
the authority to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to establish margin 
requirements for central clearing organizations in over-the-counter derivatives markets. This 
underscores the importance of margin requirements as an essential tool of derivatives exchanges.  
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between margin changes and futures price volatility. 




1. Whether margin requirements can be used as a tool to alter futures volatility is still under 
debate. Previous empirical results regarding the impact of margin changes on price 
volatility are mixed.  
2. The effect is of interest to futures market regulators, who can take into account the effect 
of margin changes on price volatility when making margin change decisions, so as to 
supervise the futures markets in a more efficient way.  
Previous empirical studies used limited data samples to examine the effects of margin 
requirements on futures price volatility, while I use a broader sample with 24 actively traded 
contracts and their corresponding latest margin change events. 
I provide evidence using univariate tests that the futures price volatility is significantly reduced 
following margin increases, while the futures price volatility increases, but to a lesser extent, 
following margin decreases. A regression analysis indicates that larger margin changes have a 
greater negative effect on price volatility. This relationship holds for the different futures contracts. 
Finally, to address the potential effects of endogeneity, I employ an instrumental variables 
technique along with two stages least squares estimation and find that the inverse relationship 




2. Literature review 
In this chapter, I review the research on margin requirements in futures markets under several 
heads.  These are: 1) the function of margin requirements; 2) the determinants of margin 
requirements; 3) whether margin requirements affect futures trading cost; 4) whether margin 




2.1  The function of margin requirements  
Initial margin requirements and subsequent variation margin payments are designed to 
guarantee that investors will perform according to the terms of the futures contract, that is, when 
there is a huge adverse price change in futures market, margins used as collateral can quickly cover 
the loss. According to Figlewski (1984), Kahl and Rutz (1985), Gay, Hunter and Kolb (1986), 
Hartzmark (1986), and Fenn and Kupiec (1993), margins set by futures exchanges are a payment 
that serves as a collateral deposit to reduce credit risk posed by customers. Telser (1981) asserts 
that it is more economical for the futures brokers to have deposits on hand in the form of margins 
that they can use to settle the amounts owed by their clients than to rely on legal proceedings to 
collect these amounts. Longin (1999) notes that the policy of requiring margin payments ensures 
the integrity of futures markets, as a high-level margin requirement protects brokers against 
insolvent customers and thus decreases default risk. He also notes that the existence of margins 
decreases the likelihood of brokers’ bankruptcy and the systemic instability of the futures market. 
Fishe, Goldberg, Gosnell and Sinha (1990) explain that margin setting authorities can decrease the 
probability of trader default and market instability by increasing the level of margins. Abruzzo and 
Park (2014) state that initial or maintenance margins are collected to cover the potential future loss 
that may arise in futures price exchanges, whereas variation margins are collected to cover realized 
losses that have already occurred. 
 
2.2  Determinants of margin requirements 
Volatility is considered the most important determinant of margin requirements. For example, 
some authors, such as Figlewski (1984), Gay, Hunter, and Kolb (1986), and Fenn and Kupiec 
(1993), investigate models that suggest that margin levels are proportional to the level of past 
volatility in futures prices, while others, such as Cotter (2001) and Longin (1999), use extreme 




Telser (1981) conducts an analysis of margin from the point of view of economic theory, and 
asserts that competition among brokers for customers is a process that determines the optimal 
margin. He constructs several thought experiments to conclude that even in an economy in which 
the government did not impose a minimum required margin and would allow the margin 
requirement to be zero, margin requirements would still exist as a result of the self-interest of 
market participants. Specifically, Telser (1981) notes that the size of margin requirement depends 
on the risk to the broker, and it changes in response to changes in this risk. When it becomes more 
likely that prices may change by large amounts during a trading session, brokers will require 
customers to post larger margins. Telser emphasizes that margin requirements are based on the 
volatility of prices over short periods rather than long periods. This is because the size of the margin 
depends on the maximum price change that may occur during that time in which the customer can 
decide whether to deposit more margin or just leave the market, and this time period is short. 
Longin (1999) develops a new method for setting the margin level based on “extreme value theory”, 
and his extreme value model incorporates volatility and Value at Risk. Telser (1981) and Hunter 
(1986) propose an economic model in which the margin level is endogenously determined. Abruzzo 
and Park (2014) document that the competition between futures exchanges is also a cause of margin 
changes, as they find evidence that the difference in margin requirements imposed by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Group (CME Group) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) is an important 
driver of margin changes even after changes in other risk factors are accounted for. 
 
2.3  Whether Margin requirements affect futures trading costs? 
Before one can consider whether altering margin levels is an effective tool for reducing 
excessive speculation and hence stabilize volatility, one must understand the magnitude of trading 
costs associated with margin requirements.  
There are various opinions on the relationship between margin requirements and the cost of 
trading. Dusak (1973) assumes that the opportunity cost associated with an open futures positions 
 5 
 
is the full value of the contract. According to Dusak, buying a futures contract is like buying a spot 
asset on credit, hence the liability is the full value of a contract rather than the margin. Black (1976), 
however, concludes that the opportunity cost/value of the contract goes to zero as the clearinghouse 
debits and credits accounts on a daily basis. 
According to Telser and Yamey (1965), Figlewski (1984), and Tomek (1984), margin 
requirements pose a cost. Telser (1981) states that even if interest-bearing Treasury Bills are used 
to satisfy some of the margin requirements, the Treasury bills thus deposited are unavailable to be 
used to meet either emergency needs or profitable investment opportunities. Hence the margin 
requirement surely imposes a cost on the investor. Telser concludes that the margin requirement 
provides insurance coverage against loss to the broker but only partially and not completely. The 
greater is the size of the margin requirement, the smaller is the risk of loss to the broker, but the 
higher is the cost of trading to the customers of the brokers. Tomek （1984）also explains that 
even if the initial margin for futures position is in the form of an interest-bearing Treasury bill, 
margins still impose a cost on the investor. Figlewski （1984） states that higher initial margin 
means higher trading costs, which lead to less participation. Hartzmark (1986) notes that equal 
margin requirements do not necessarily imply equal margin costs across individual traders; as a 
result, the liquidity cost associated with margin requirements varies across traders. Furthermore, 
Hartzmark (1986) supports the contention that margin requirements impose costs on traders 
through his empirical results, since he finds significant changes in trading activity after margin 
increases. Hartzmark states that “If margin levels were irrelevant to trader decisions, then changing 
them would have no effect on open interest, volume, and the composition of traders. As they impose 
costs on traders, exchanges wish to keep them as low as possible to guarantee that the markets 
remain liquid.” Longin (1999) states that the margin mechanism should be seen as a trade-off 
between margin committees, brokers and investors, since a high-level margin requirement imposes 
extra trading costs on investors at the same time. It is in the self-interest of the exchanges to keep 





2.4  Whether Margin Requirements affect the composition of futures traders and   futures 
price volatility? 
According to Black (1986), Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Campbell and 
Kyle (1993), Campell, Ltttau, and Xu (2001) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), the 
noise/uninformed traders are the ones who exacerbate market price volatility. Hence, if the 
exchange wants to limit volatility in the futures market, it needs to drive these traders out of the 
market. However, Hartzmark’s (1986) analysis shows that the effect of changes in margin 
requirements will vary across different traders. “Since investors have their own unique liquidity 
cost and risk preferences, one cannot say unequivocally that an across-the-board margin increase 
will drive out relatively more uninformed, undercapitalized traders than informed, low-probability-
of-default traders. Hence it will be impossible to predict the extent to which different groups of 
traders will exit the market when faced with these changes.” As a result, we do not know whether 
increasing margin requirements increases or reduces futures price volatility. 
Previous empirical results regarding the impact of margin changes on price volatility are mixed. 
For example, Hardouvelis and Kim (1995), Chatrath, Adrangi and Allender (2001), Daskalaki and 
Skiadoopoulos (2012), report a positively significant relation between margin changes and price 
volatility, while Ma, Kao, and Frohlich (1993) examine the silver market and find a strong negative 
impact of margin changes on volatility across various subperiods. Further, Hsiao and Shanker 
(2014) study the effect and document a negative relationship between margin changes and volatility 
after taking into account the effect of price limits. Hartzmark (1986), Kupiec (1987), and Fishe, 
Goldberg, Gosnell, and Sinha (1990), however, do not find a consistent relationship between 
margin changes and price volatility. 
Hartzmark’s empirical results are based on only 13 margin requirement changes and suggest 
that margin levels are directly related to market activity, and the composition of traders. Specifically, 
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if margins are increased to very high levels, certain trader groups will be driven from the market, 
making the market thinner. With a thinly traded market, margin changes might then cause drastic 
or discontinuous changes in the composition of the market with the result being less stable futures 
prices. On the other hand, if the margin change is small, “the effects of margin changes on 
composition are equivalent to coin tossing.” Thus, the margin requirements should be used as 
performance bonds only.  
As noted by Miller (1988), “driving major classes of users to seek alternatives to futures 
exchanges not only reduces the revenues of these exchanges but undermines the liquidity and 
market depth that is the very reason for their existence.” Telser (1981) notes that, when margin 
requirements increase, assuming no change in the expected returns per unit of each asset, the effect 
is a reduction in the size of the open interest and in the volume of trade of that commodity. This is 
because, the higher margin induces higher trading costs, while higher trading costs in turn reduce 
the size of the open interest and the volume of trade. Whether the margin requirement increase 
reduces the futures price volatility depends on the nature of the forces that determine price volatility. 
Burghardt, and Kohn (1981) suggest, “Margin requirements even if it were desirable to constrain 
the behavior of financial market participants, it might do no good to try.” Anderson (1981) 
addresses Telser’s model and its applicability to reality. He notes that Telser’s conclusion is 
somewhat wrong and the result of the positive relationship between margin requirements and the 
variance of futures prices is biased as the model is inaccurate. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) 
assume that speculators are more sensitive than hedgers to changes in margin requirements. 
Similarly, Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos (2013) document that speculators decrease their open 
interest positions more than hedgers do when facing margin increases.  
As reported by Hardouvelis and Kim (1995), margin changes affect the volume of trades. Chou, 
Wang and Wang (2014) examine the effects of margin changes on futures trading activity on the 
Taiwan Futures Exchange and find that margin increases reduce trading activity for all trader types. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher margins increase the costs of trading. 
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They also find that institutional traders are more sensitive to changes in margin requirements than 
individual traders. These findings suggest that raising margin requirements causes all types of 
traders to leave the market, but as institutional traders are more sensitive to such changes and are 
subsequently more likely to leave the market, thus markets are left with relatively more noise 
traders (individuals) and this in turn leads to greater price volatility and less market liquidity. These 
results imply that changing margin requirements is not an effective policy tool in limiting the 




3.1 Futures contracts addressed 
In this thesis, I examine the relationship between margin changes and volatility in futures 
markets. 24 actively traded futures contracts on the CME Group (Chicago Mercantile Exchange & 
Chicago Board of Trade) are studied. The sample covers four different asset classes, including 
agriculture, equity, interest rates and currency. The agriculture  futures contracts include Corn 
Futures, Feeder Cattle Futures, Lean Hog Futures, Live Cattle Futures, Soybean Meal Futures, 
Soybean Oil Futures, Soybean Futures and Chicago SRW Wheat Futures; the equity futures 
contracts include the DJIA ($10) Futures, NASDAQ 100 Futures, Nikkei/USD Futures and S&P 
500 Futures; the currency futures contracts include Australian Dollar Futures, British Pound 
Futures, Canadian Dollar Futures, Euro FX Futures, Japanese Yen Futures, New Zealand Dollar 
Futures, and Swiss Franc Futures; the interest rate futures contracts include 2-Year T-Note Futures, 
5-Year T-Note Futures, 10-Year T-Note Futures, U.S. Treasury Bond Futures, and Ultra U.S. 
Treasury Bond Futures. I exclude Energy, Metal and Eurodollar contracts since the historical data 
on margin requirements changes from the CME Group for these contracts do not apply to all 
contract months, but are applicable to specific contracts in different tiers or with different expiry 
months, so it is extremely hard to calculate percentage margin changes for those contracts as one 
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has to find the previous margin value for the specific contracts.  
 
3.2 Historical data on margin requirements    
The historical data on margin requirements available from the CME Group website starts on 
different dates for the various contracts included in the sample but extend through December 2014 
for all contracts. Table 1 provides a list of the futures contracts included in the empirical test, the 
period for which margin requirement changes are provided and the corresponding number of 
changes in margin requirements. The historical data provides initial margin and maintenance 
margin for both speculators and hedgers. For speculators, the initial margin requirement would be 
a certain percent higher than the maintenance margin, while for hedgers the initial margin is the 
same as the maintenance margin. At the same time, the maintenance margin level for both 
speculators and hedgers is identical. The exchange sets the initial margin requirement for 
speculators a certain percent higher than that for hedger. This is rational as speculators normally 
pose higher default risk than hedgers. Telser (1981) explains the reasoning as follows: “a long 
hedger has a long futures position and a short spot position while a short hedger has the opposite. 
The prices of the commodities in which the hedger has long positions move in the same direction 
as the prices of the commodities in which he has short positions, there is an offsetting of the gains 
and losses on balance. As a result, the default risk of the hedger is lower than that of the speculator 
as speculators normally have naked positions.” The maintenance margin represents the minimum 
levels that the futures exchange and brokers must impose on their customers. These are determined 
by the futures clearing house.  
I set a few rules to ensure that I collect comparable margins for each contract over time. For 
agriculture contracts, margins are differently set for new-crop and old-crop contracts, although 
these margins are rarely different. Due to the nature of the underlying product and the different 
times at which it is harvested, (for example the crop season for soybean meal usually goes from 
December to November of the next year), there is a different risk profile for the new crop versus 
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the old crop due to differences in supply, weather, expected demand, etc. I choose to use the margin 
data when the margin levels for the new-crop and the old-crop are identical. If neither old- nor 
new-crop is specified, I still collect the margin data as in that case the margin level is effective for 
both the new-crop and the old-crop. For live cattle and feeder cattle contracts, margin requirements 
are different for delivery months and for other months. The delivery month margin requirement is 
only applicable to the contract with delivery month the same as the margin change month. For 
example, for the live cattle futures contract, on Jan 1st, 2000, when both delivery and other month 
margin requirements are provided, the delivery month margin requirement is only applied to the 
contract with a delivery month of January 2000, while the general margin requirement applies to 
the contracts with delivery in subsequent months. In this case, I collect the margin data when the 
margin level for the delivery month and other months are identical, similarly, if neither delivery 
nor other month is specified, I still record the data. I exclude changes in margin requirements which 
are too close (within 20 days), since overlapping time periods preceding and following margin 
changes may have confounding effects on the results. After cleaning the data in accordance with 
the above, 1040 margin requirement changes in total are obtained.   
 
3.3 Futures price data 
I obtain data on daily settlement prices, open interest, and trading volume for individual futures 
contracts from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Data are collected for each front month contract, 
which is the closest to delivery contract traded for each product at the time of a margin change, 
excluding contracts expiring within one month, or those with insufficient trading volume and open 
interest. The reasoning is that the closest to delivery contract is usually the most actively traded 
and liquid contract. I also examine contracts which are the second closest to delivery at the time of 





Chapter 4  
4. Hypothesis 
Margin requirements are often viewed by regulators as an important policy tool to reduce 
excessive volatility and maintain stability.   The hypotheses that I investigate are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: There should be a significant difference between the futures price volatility that 
follows the margin change from the futures price volatility that preceded the margin change. If the 
margin change is an increase in the margin, then the volatility should decrease, while if the margin 
change is a decrease in the margin, then the volatility should increase. 
Hypothesis 2: Larger margin changes should be expected to produce greater effects on the 
futures price volatility. 
The existing literature presents different views upon how margin requirements affect the 
composition of futures traders and thus affect futures price volatility. As noted by Hartzmark (1986), 
margin requirements pose a unique liquidity cost to traders. One cannot predict whether the traders 
who contribute to stabilizing or destabilizing the market volatility will leave. However, it is widely 
accepted by scholars that margin requirements do pose a cost to futures market customers. The 
higher the margin level, the higher the liquidity cost. The psychology effect of investors then may 
play a part in futures transactions. That is, customers, especially speculators, might be inclined to 
trade more cautiously, thus stabilizing volatility when margin requirements are higher. Speculators 
might be willing to trade more aggressively and destabilize volatility when only a small margin 
(cost) is required. This assumption is based on a mental accounting effect. The accounting effect 
might be amplified when the margin requirement changes by a considerable amount. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between margin changes and the futures price volatility may 
differ for different asset classes of futures contracts. 
Due to the different features of financial and non-financial assets, the level of margin 
requirements that affects volatility should differ for different asset classes of futures contracts. 
Financial asset are easier to get access to as there are broader markets for investing in financial 
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assets, and hence investors can diversify these investments better. As a result, investors in financial 
futures contracts should be less sensitive to market adjustments (margin requirement changes) than 
investors in non-financial futures contracts.     
 
Chapter 5 
5. Estimators of variables 
5.1 Estimate of the change in margin 
Since in futures market the maintenance margin level for both speculators and hedgers is 
identical, for speculators, the initial margin requirement would be a certain percentage higher than 
the maintenance margin, and for hedgers, the initial margin requirement will be the same as the 
maintenance margin. In most cases, when the margin requirement changes, the initial margin for 
speculators, the initial margin for hedgers, the maintenance margin for speculators and the 
maintenance margin for hedgers, all change by the same percentage. For this reason, the empirical 
analysis that follows is based on initial margins only. Then, percentage changes in the initial margin 
levels are calculated. These represent the dollar change in the margin requirement divided by the 
dollar amount of the margin prior to the change. For example, for the CME S&P 500 futures 
contract the initial margin requirement for speculators was increased from $22,275 to $24,750 
effective October 1, 2008. This represents an 11% increase in the initial margin requirement.  
 
5.2 Estimators of the change in volatility 
In this paper, I use two estimators of volatility, which I term volatility measure 1 and volatility 
measure 2. The first is called the Close-to-Close Volatility Estimator which is also known as the 
“classical” estimator. This estimator of volatility for day t, 𝜎𝑡 is the standard deviation of the 




∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑡−𝑁
𝑖=𝑡−1                               (5.1) 
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where the log return xi is defined as:.  
𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝑛 (
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑖−1
)          (5.2)                
where 𝑐𝑖 is the futures contract’s closing price on day i, and 𝑐𝑖−1 is the futures contract’s 
closing price on the previous day 𝑖 − 1. 
and ?̅? = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑥𝑖) for the days t-1 through t-N. 
 
Bennett and Gil (2012) note that, “The calculation for standard deviation calculates the 
deviation from the average log return (or drift). This average log return has to be estimated from 
the sample, which can cause problems if the return over the period sampled is very high or negative. 
As over the long term very high or negative returns are not realistic, the calculation of volatility 
can be corrupted by using the sample log return as the expected future return. For example, if an 
underlying rises 10% a day for 10 days, the volatility of the stock is zero (as there is zero deviation 
from the 10% average return). This is why volatility calculations are normally more reliable if a 
zero return is assumed.” Based on the above explanation of Bennett and Gil, volatility measure 2 
is the square root of the average of the past N squared log returns. 
In order to test the robustness as well as the trend of the effect, I use three different values for 
N, 3 days, 5 days and 10 days and term the corresponding volatilities as 3-days-volatility, 5-days-
volatility and 10-days-volatility. Suppose that day 0 is the day of the margin requirement change. 
For example, to estimate the 3-day volatility preceding the margin change I use days -1 to -3 and 
to estimate the volatility following the margin change I use days 0 through 2. The percentage 
change in the volatility is calculated as the difference between the volatility following the margin 
change and the volatility preceding the margin change as a percentage of the volatility which 
precedes the margin change. 
 
5.3 Estimators of the change in market activity 
The corresponding percentage change in market activity is estimated by two variables:  
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percentage change in the open interest and the percentage change in the trading volume change for 
the 3 horizons, 3 days, 5 days and 10 days. 
 
5.4 Summary statistics on data used in the analysis  
After merging the data on changes in the margin with the data on the changes in volatility, 839 
valid observations are obtained. The summary statistics are reported in Table 2. This table shows 
the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the percentage change in margin, 
volatility, open interest and volume. The 3 day change is based on comparing the statistic for days 
0 to 2 to that for days -1 to -3, The 5 day change is based on comparing the statistic for days 0 to 4 
to that for days -1 to -5, The 10 day change is based on comparing the statistic for days 0 to 9 to 
that for days -1 to -10. Notice that volatility percentage change for short horizon is higher than that 




6. Methodology and results of empirical tests. 
 
6.1 Univariate analysis  
Paired t-tests are used to verify if there is significant difference between the average futures 
price volatility preceding and following the change in margin. Table 3 shows the results. In what 
follows, I describe the results for: 1) All margin changes; 2) Margin increases; 3) Margin decreases. 
6.1.1. All margin changes 
In Table 3, panel 1, we can see that for the 3-day and 5-day intervals, the hypothesis that the 
average futures price volatility before and after the margin changes are equal is rejected at the 1% 
level for all the futures contracts combined.  
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6.1.2. Margin increases 
For margin increases, both volatility measurements show very similar results. The volatility 
preceding the margin change is significantly higher than the volatility following the margin change 
for all three horizons. For example, with volatility measure 1, the mean differences for the 3-day 
volatility, 5-day volatility and 10-day volatility are 0.3506, 0.2372, and 0.0931 respectively. From 
the trend of the three numbers we can conclude that margin increases reduce volatility over a short 
horizon, and this effect gradually weakens as time passes.  
6.1.3. Margin decreases 
For margin decreases, the volatility change is ambiguous. For the volatility estimator 2, only 
the 10-day interval exhibits a statistically (5% level) significant volatility difference. For volatility 
measure 2, while both the 5-day and 10-day volatility differences are statistically significant, the 
magnitude of the differences are relatively small. Since the differences are negative, the conclusion 
is that margin decreases increase volatility, but to a lesser extent than margin increases decrease 
volatility. This result may partially explain Abruzzo and Park’s (2014) results. They find that the 
CME Group raises margins quickly following volatility spikes but does not immediately lower 
margins following volatility declines. As compared to increasing margin, decreasing margin is a 
less effective way to affect futures price volatility, so there is no need to lower margin requirements 
immediately after experiencing volatility declines.  
 
6.2 Multivariate analysis. 
6.2.1. Regression analysis of the effect of the margin change 
The univariate analysis does not differentiate among margin changes of different sizes. Larger 
margin changes should have a greater effect on the futures price volatility than smaller changes. 
The univariate analysis cannot also consider the simultaneous effect of other factors such as market 
activity upon the futures price volatility. To address these effects, the percentage change in the 
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futures price volatility is regressed on the percentage change in margins and the percentage change 
in open interest, in accordance with equation 6.1, which follows.  
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽2% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 +
𝜀                                                                                                                               (6.1) 
Where  𝛽0, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the coefficients of the regression, and  𝜀 represents the error term 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis.  
The results are similar for both volatility estimates. For example, with volatility measure 1, the 
coefficients of the percentage change in the margin for 3-day volatility, 5-day volatility and 10-day 
volatility are -0.76585, -0.51041, and -0.37862 respectively, and are statistically significant at the 
5%, 1% and 1% level, respectively. The negative sign indicates that when the margin requirement 
increases, the volatility declines. Also from the magnitude of the three numbers we conclude that 
the effect is stronger for shorter time intervals and weakens as time passes. The results are almost 
the same as when I substitute volume for open interest as the control variable, so I do not include 
those results in the table. I report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors 
throughout the analysis, since White’s test indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity for all 
regressions. 
 
 6.2.2. Effect of the asset class 
To study the relationship between changes in the margin requirement and changes in the futures 
price volatility for the different asset classes, I use two dummy variables, “Financial” and “Non-
Financial”, which assume values of zero or one under certain conditions, as explained in what 
follows.   
"Financial" = {   
1, if the futures contract is an equity, interest rate or currency futures contract                     






    1, if the futures contract is an agriculture futures contract                                                         
0, otherwise;                                                                                                                    
 
 
The regression model is described in equation 6.2 which follows: 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 +
𝛽2%𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛-Financial + 𝛽3% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀  
                                                                                                                           (6.2) 
Where 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are the coefficients of the regression and 𝜀 is the error term 
The interaction terms “%change in margin*Financial” and “%change in margin*Non-
Financial” are included to determine if the effect of the margin change differs by the underlying 
asset class.   
Table 5 presents the results. The coefficients for the two interaction terms are negative, which 
indicates that the negative relationship between the change in the margin requirement and the 
change in the volatility holds for both types of futures contracts. However, in other respects, the 
results for the two volatility estimates exhibit somewhat different results. For volatility estimate 1, 
for both the 5-day volatility and 10-day volatility, the coefficients of the two interaction terms are 
statistically significant, with the effect of the margin change being higher for the non-financial asset 
class than for the financial asset class. This suggests that compared to financial futures contracts, 
margin increases for non-financial futures contracts decrease volatility more significantly. 
However this result does not hold for volatility estimate 2. The interaction of the Non-Financial 
dummy variable with the percentage change in margin is not significant for the 3-day and 5-day 
volatility changes. The coefficients of both interaction terms are statistically significant for the 
volatility estimate 2 for the 10-day volatility change, with the effect being smaller for the non-
financial asset class than for the financial asset class.  
Summing up, the negative relationship between changes in margin requirements and changes 
in volatility holds for both financial and non-financial futures contracts. The results are almost the 
same when I substitute volume for open interest as the control variable, so I do not include those 
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results in the table.  
 
6.2.3. Accounting for endogeneity in the changes in margin  
According to Greene and William (2012), in a statistical model, a variable is said to be 
endogenous when there is a correlation between the variable and the error term. Two common 
causes of endogeneity are: 1) a loop of causality between the independent and dependent variables 
of a model; 2) an uncontrolled confounder causing both independent and dependent variables of a 
model. Endogeneity may cause spurious regression and thus induce false relationships. For 
example, in a simple supply and demand model, the price is endogenous as customers change their 
demand in response to price and producers change their price in response to demand. In this case, 
a simple linear regression model with price and demand may obtain a false result given the effect 
of a loop of causality.     
In using an ordinary least squares regression analysis, an endogeneity issue might arise in 
analyzing the effect of margin changes on the futures price volatility, since futures exchanges 
increase margin requirements in response to increases in the futures price volatility.   
To address the potential presence of endogeneity, I employ the instrumental variables 
technique and two stages least squares estimation. There are two criteria that a reasonable 
instrumental variable should satisfy. First, there should be a high correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the instrumental variable. Second, the correlation between the 
instrumental variable and the error term in the regression should be as small as possible. 
I choose the 30-day volatility percentage change preceding the margin change as the 
instrumental variable, the volatility percentage change preceding the margin change is calculated 
as comparing the volatility for days -30 to -1 to that for days -60 to -31. This is for two reasons. 1)  
As margins in futures markets are set based on the historical futures price volatility, the higher is 
the volatility change in the two months preceding the margin requirement change, the greater 
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should be the size of the change. 2) As a length of 30 days is comparatively large, the correlation 
between the 30-day volatility percentage change preceding the margin change and percentage 
change in volatility based on a much smaller interval should be small.   
The two stage least-squares estimation is described by the following equations 6.3 and 6.4. 
 
First stage:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 60 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 + 𝜀         
                                         (6.3) 
Where 𝛽0 and  𝛽1 are the coefficients of the regression, and 𝜀 is the error term 
 
      Second stage:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 +
𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀          
                                                                                                                       (6.4) 
Where 𝛽0, 𝛽1, and 𝛽2 are the coefficients of the regression, and 𝜀 is the error term 
Table 6 provides the results.  The results of the regression analysis for the first stage indicate 
that as expected, the margin requirement is set on the basis of historical volatility change and that 
this effect is positive and statistically significant. The estimated percentage change in margin 
requirements as estimated by the first stage regression analysis is used as the dependent variable in 
the second stage regression analysis. The results of table 6 indicate that the coefficients of the 
estimated percentage change in margin requirements are still statistically significant and negative. 
Thus, that the results indicate that the negative relationship between margin changes and futures 






The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed in 2010.  One 
aspect of the act provides the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) the authority 
to establish margin requirements for over-the-counter derivatives contracts cleared through central 
counterparties and underlines the importance of margin requirements as a tool that could be used 
by the exchanges to control volatility of derivatives instruments’ prices. However, whether margin 
requirements can be utilized as a tool to alter the market volatility or they are used as performance 
bonds only is still controversial. To address this question, I investigate the relationship between 
margin changes and futures price volatility.  
First, I provide evidence that the futures price volatility following margin increases is 
significantly reduced, while the effect of margin decreases on futures price volatility increases is 
much weaker. This may partially explain Abruzzo and Park’s findings (2014), which show that, as 
compared to increasing margin, decreasing margin is a less effective way to affect futures market 
volatility, hence there is no need to lower margin requirement immediately after experiencing 
volatility declines. Second, my empirical results differentiate among margin changes by the size of 
the margin change and suggest that larger margin changes produce a greater effect on price 
volatility. Third, I study the relationship between margin and volatility changes for different 
underlying asset classes. I find that the negative relationship between margin requirements and 
volatility holds for both financial and non-financial futures contracts, and there is no indication that 
the relationship varies for different asset classes. 
Lastly, I address the potential effect of endogeneity of changes in margin requirements by 
employing an instrumental variables technique and two stage least squares estimation and find that 
the negative relationship between changes in margin requirements and changes in the futures price 
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Table 1: Futures contracts included in the empirical tests 
This table reports the list of historical margins from CME Group. The margin data start on different dates for various contracts but 
end at December 2014 for all contracts. 24 actively traded futures contracts on the CME Group (Chicago Mercantile Exchange & 
Chicago Board of Trade) are studied. The sample covers four different asset classes, agriculture, equity, interest rates and 
currency. 
Futures contract Asset Class Exchange Period 
Number of 
changes in margin 
requirements 
Corn  Agriculture CBOT 2003-2014 32 
Feeder Cattle  Agriculture CME 2003-2014 40 
Lean Hog  Agriculture CME 2003-2014 33 
Live Cattle  Agriculture CME 2003-2014 41 
Soybean Meal  Agriculture CBOT 2003-2014 37 
Soybean Oil  Agriculture CBOT 2003-2014 32 
Soybean  Agriculture CBOT 2003-2014 45 
Chicago SRW Wheat  Agriculture CBOT 2003-2014 40 
DJIA ($10)  Equity CBOT 2003-2014 17 
NASDAQ 100  Equity CME 2003-2014 25 
Nikkei/USD  Equity CME 2003-2014 5 
S&P 500  Equity CME 2003-2014 18 
Australian Dollar  Currency CME 2000-2014 51 
British Pound  Currency CME 2000-2014 47 
Canadian Dollar  Currency CME 2000-2014 53 
Euro FX  Currency CME 2000-2014 58 
Japanese Yen  Currency CME 2000-2014 48 
New Zealand Dollar  Currency CME 2000-2014 15 
Swiss Franc  Currency CME 2000-2014 52 
2-Year T-Note  Interest rates CBOT 2003-2014 24 
5-Year T-Note  Interest rates CBOT 2003-2014 37 
10-Year T-Note  Interest rates CBOT 2003-2014 41 
U.S. Treasury Bond  Interest rates CBOT 2003-2014 45 





Table 2: Summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis 
.  
Percentage change in   









Volatility measure 1 
 
 



















      5 day change 839 7.90  -4.36  -85.38  628.87  64.84  
 3 day change 839 21.24  -11.85  -94.87  936.49  185.56  
Volatility measure 2  10 day change 839 6.19  -2.48  -75.95  260.95  44.24  
      5 day change 839 12.82  -4.30  -86.32  696.99  74.28  
 3 day change 839 54.87  -11.72  -98.87  1593.23  328.76  
Open Interest  10 day change 839 163.94  5.89  -51.36  4868.43  700.91  
 5 day change 839 45.73  3.07  -32.67  1133.18  181.03  
 3 day change 839 19.86  1.77  -28.52  568.05  81.76  
Volume 
10 day change                           
5 day change 
3 day change 
839 385.79 6.50 -84.35 11319.70 2048 
839 159.37 3.00 -85.00 2133.00 2308.00 













Table 3: Comparison of the futures price volatility preceding and following the change in the margin 
 
                 


























          
Panel A: All margin changes (839)         
Volatility Estimate 1 1.1145  1.0918  -0.0227 1.1512  1.0484  -0.1028***  1.1668  0.9965  -0.1704***  
   (-1.21)   (-4.02)   (-5.44) 
Volatility Estimate 2 1.1034  1.0909  -0.0125  1.1398  1.0374  -0.1024***  1.1397  0.9704  -0.1693***  
      (-0.65)     (-3.66)     (-4.69) 
Panel B: Margin increases alone (436)                 
          
Volatility Estimate 1 1.3897  1.2966  -0.0931***  1.4863  1.2492  -0.2372***  1.5334  1.1829  -0.3506***  
   (-2.97)   (-5.53)   (-6.69) 
Volatility Estimate 1 1.3709  1.2996  -0.0712**  1.4609  1.2353  -0.2257***  1.4743  1.1565  -0.3178***  
      (-2.22)     (-4.76)     (-5.22) 
Panel C: Margin decreases alone (403)                 
          
Volatility Estimate 1 0.8167  0.8703  0.0536***  0.7886  0.8311  0.0425*  0.7702  0.7948  0.0246  
   (2.9)   (1.75)   (0.84) 
Volatility Estimate 1 0.8140  0.8650  0.0510**  0.7925  0.8234  0.0310  0.7776  0.7690  -0.0086  
      (2.58)     (1.19)     (-0.25) 










Table 4: Results of the regression analysis of the percentage change in the volatility on the percentage change in the margin and the 
percentage change in the open interest 
 
 Coefficient/t statistic 
 Dependent variable 
  Percentage change in volatility estimate 1 Percentage change in volatility estimate 2 
Independent variable     10 day      5 day      3 day     10 day      5 day      3 day 
Percentage change in 
the margin  
-0.3786***  -0.5104***   -0.7659**  -0.3471***   -0.4439***   -1.3130**  
 (-5.82) (-4.72) (-2.45) (-4.71) (-3.56) (-2.37) 
Percentage change in 
the open interest 
-0.0013  -0.0164  -0.0742  -0.0022  -0.0111  -0.0893  
 (-0.69) (-1.34) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-0.78) (-0.64) 
Intercept 5.6280***  10.3754***   25.3061***   7.7250***   14.8291***   61.0850***  
 (4.06) (4.48) (3.79) (4.91) (5.56) (5.16) 
Number of 
Observations 
839 839 839 839 839 839 
Note * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant 












Table 5: The effect of asset class upon the relationship between changes in margin requirements and changes in volatility 
 
                    Volatility Measure 1                          Volatility Measure 2 
Independent variable      10 day         5 day       3 day          10 day       5 day         3 day 
% change in margin 
requirement*Financial 
-0.3548***  -0.5099***  -1.0050**  -0.3534***  -0.5100***  -1.8722**  
 (-4.10) (-3.54)  (-2.42) (-3.61)  (-3.08)  (-2.54)  
%change in margin 
requirement*Non-Financial 
-0.4090***  -0.5111***  -0.4623  -0.3390***  -0.3601**  -0.6032  
 (-4.20)  (-3.16)  (-0.99)  (-3.07)  (-1.93)  (-0.73)  
%Change in open interest -0.0013  -0.0164  -0.0762  -0.0022  -0.0114  -0.0938  
 (-0.68)  (-1.33) (-0.97)  (-1.03)  (-0.80)  (-0.68)  
Intercept 5.6193***  10.3751***  25.4087***  7.7273***  14.8591***  61.3249***  
 (4.05)  (4.48)  (3.81)  (4.91)  (5.56)  (5.18)  
Number of Observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 














Table 6: Results of the two-stage least squares analysis of the relationship between changes in margin requirements and changes in the 
futures price volatility  
 
                                             Coefficients/t statistics 
                                                Dependent variable 
  First Stage Second Stage 
                                                                      
Percentage change in 
margin 
Percentage change in volatility 
 Independent variable  
             10 day 
 
              5 day 
 
                3 day 
 
 Coefficient/t statistic Coefficient/t statistic Coefficient/t statistic Coefficient/t statistic 
Futures price volatility percentage 
change preceding margin change 
0.0545***        
 (12.54)    
Percentage change in margin  -0.9996***  -1.3763***   -1.9856**  
  (-5.81) (-4.88) (-2.51) 
Percentage change in open interest   -0.0010  -0.0152  -0.0720  
  (-0.50) (-1.20) (-0.91) 
Intercept -0.0263  7.6791***   13.2556***   29.3941***   
 (-0.04) (4.93) (5.17) (4.09) 
Number of Observations 839 839 839 839 
Note * statistically significant at the 10% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, *** statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
